We consider bargaining problems between one buyer and one seller for a single object. The seller's valuation and the buyer's valuation for the object are assumed to be independent random variables, and each individual's valuation is unknown to the other. We characterize the set of allocation mechanisms that are Bayesian incentive compatible and individually rational, and show the general impossibility of ex post efficient mechanisms without outside subsidies. For a wide class of problems we show how to compute mechanisms that maximize expected total gains from trade, and mechanisms that can maximize a broker's expected profit. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: 026.
1. INTRODUCTION Vickrey [7] showed the fundamental impossibility of designing a mechanism for negotiating the terms of trade in such a way that (i) honest revelation of supply and demand curves is a dominant strategy for all individuals, (ii) no outside subsidy is needed, and (iii) the final allocation of goods is always Pareto-efficient ex post. D'Aspremont and Gerard-Varet [3] weakened the incentive criterion from dominant-strategy to Bayesian Nash equilibrium, and showed that Bayesian incentive-compatible mechanisms could achieve efficient allocations without outside subsidies. However, the mechanisms of D'Aspremont and Gerard-Varet may give negative expected gains from trade to some individuals. That is, an individual who already knows his true preferences (but still does not know the preferences of the other individuals) may expect to do worse in the d'Aspremont-Gerard-Varet mechanism than if no trade took place. In this paper we prove some results relating to the efficiency properties of Bayesian incentive-compatible mechanisms that are individually rational, in the sense that each individual expects nonnegative gains from trade in any state of his preferences. We restrict our attention here to the simplest trading problems, where two individuals, one of whom has a single indivisible object to sell to the other, attempt to agree on an exchange of the object for money.
Chatterjee and Samuelson [2] have studied this two-person trading problem. For some specific bargaining games, they characterized the Bayesian equilibria. Chatterjee [l] has also studied the impossibility of simple mechanisms satisfying efficiency and individual rationality. In this paper we analyze a more general class of mechanisms, using some techniques similar to those developed in Myerson [6] to analyze optimal auction design. We show, as an application of our results, that if the traders' priors about each other's reservation prices are symmetric and uniform, then one of the games studied by Chatterjee and Samuelson [2] has equilibria that result in maximal expected gains from trade.
In the context of public goods economies, Laffont and Maskin [4] have also studied Bayesian incentive-compatible mechanisms that achieve ex post efficiency. Using a differentiability assumption (that the efficient level of the public goods depends differentiably on the consumers' types), they have shown for a very general class of problems that ex post efftciency and individual rationality may be incompatible. Although their differentiability assumption cannot be used in the trading problems which we study here, we derive an impossibility result (Corollary 1) that is closely related to this result.
The plan of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we first define the formal structure of the bilateral trading problem. We then present a general characterization of all rules for transferring the object (as a function of the traders' valuations) that can be implemented by incentive-compatible individually-rational mechanisms. In Section 3, we show it is generally impossible to have a mechanism that is incentive-compatible, individuallyrational, and ex post efficient, in the sense that it transfers the object to the buyer if and only if his valuation for the object is higher. In proving this result, we also show how to compute the smallest lump-sum subsidy that would be required from an outside party to make such an ex post efficient mechanism possible. In Section 4, we show how to construct mechanisms which maximize the expected total gains from trade, subject to the constraints of individual rationality and incentive compatibility. In Section 5, we consider the case where the traders are intermediated by a broker, who may either subsidize or exploit their desire to trade. We characterize the incentive-compatible individually rational trading mechanisms feasible with a broker, and we show how to construct mechanisms that maximize the broker's expected profit.
INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY AND INDIVIDUAL RATIONALITY
Let us consider a trading problem where individual #l owns an object that individual #2 wants to buy. We let 9, and pZ denote the values of the object to the seller (#l) and the buyer (#2), respectively, and assume tha_t these two valuations are independent random variables, with each Vi distributed over a given interval from ai to b,. Let fi(.) and f2(.) be the probability density functions for VI and pZ,, respectively. We assume that eachfi(.) is continuous and positive on its domain [ai, b,]. We let F,(e) and ZJZ(.) be the cumulative distribution functions corresponding tofr and f2 (so fi = Ff).
We assume that each individual knows his own valuation at the time of bargaining, but he considers the other's valuation as a random variable, distributed as above. Thus, to guarantee that each individual is willing to participate in a bargaining mechanism, the appropriate individual rationality constraint is that the mechanism gives each individual i nonnegative expected gains from trade in the mechanism, regardless of his given valuation pi. Finally, we assume that the individuals are risk neutral and have additively separable utility for money and the object.
These two individuals are going to participate in some bargaining game or mechanism to determine, first, whether the object should be transferred from the seller to the buyer and, second, how much the buyer should pay to the seller. Our general question is: what kinds of bargaining mechanisms can be designed that have good economic efficiency properties?
A direct bargaining mechanism is one in which each individual simultaneously reports his valuation to a coordinater or broker who then determines whether the object is transferred, and how much the buyer must pay. A direct mechanism is thus characterized by two outcome functions, denoted by p(., .) and x(., .), where p(u,, vl) is the probability that the object is transferred to the buyer and x(v,, u,) is the expected payment from buyer to seller if 2rI and u, are the reported valuations of the seller and buyer. A direct mechanism is (Buyesiun) incentive-compatible if honest reporting forms a Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
That is, in an incentive-compatible mechanism, each individual can maximize his expected utility by reporting his true valuation, given that the other is expected to report honestly.
We can, without any loss of generality, restrict our attention to incentivecompatible direct mechanisms. This is because, for any Bayesian equilibrium of any bargaining game, there is an equivalent incentive-compatible direct mechanism that always yields the same outcomes (when the individuals play the honest equilibrium). This result, which is well known and very general, is called the revelation principle. The essential idea is that, given any equilibrium of any bargaining game, we can construct an equivalent incentive-compatible direct mechanism by first asking the buyer and seller each to confidentially report his valuation, then computing what each would have done in the given equilibrium strategies with these valuations, and then implementing the outcome (transfer of money and object) as in the given game for this computed behavior. If either individual had any incentive to lie to us in this direct mechanism, then he would have had an incentive to lie to himself in the original game, which is a contradiction of the premise that he was in equilibrium in the original game. (For more on this revelation principle, see Myerson [5] and [6] .) Given a direct mechanism with outcome functions (p, x), we define that following quantities:
Thus U,(u,) is the expected gains from trade for the seller if his valuation is u1 , since Z,(u,) is his expected revenue and p,(u ,) is his probability of losing the object given P, = ui. Similarly, U,(u,) is the expected gains from trade for the buyer, f2(u2) is the buyer's expected payment, and &(uz) is the buyer's probability of getting the object, if his valuation is oz.
In our formal notation, we say that (p, 
Proof of Theorem 1. Suppose first that we are given an incentivecompatible mechanism (p, x). By incentive compatibility, we know that, for any two possible valuations vr and G, for the seller, and
These two inequalities imply that
Thus, if u^, > v1 , we must have ~7,(v^,) <p,(v,), so p,(a) is decreasing. Furthermore, since fir(.) is decreasing, it is Riemann integrable, and so (3) implies that U;(vl) = +-,(v,) at almost every v1 and 
Equations (4) and (5) imply that U,(.) is decreasing and U,(e) is increasing. Furthermore, we get:
(12
Equating the first and last of these expressions gives us Eq. (1) of Theorem 1, which in turn implies inequality (2) when the mechanism is individuallyrational. Thus, we have proven the first sentence and the "only if' part of the second sentence in Theorem 1.
To complete the proof of Theorem 1, suppose now that p(., .) satisfies (2), p,(m) is decreasing, and &(.) is increasing. We must construct the payment function x(., a) so that (p, X) is an individually rational, incentive-compatible mechanism. There are many such functions which could be used; we shall consider a function defined as follows:
I I
Notice that, since &(.) and -PI(.) are monotone increasing, each integral in (6) is a nonnegative quantity (assuming a, > 0 and a2 > 0). The first term in (6) depends only on v2, the second term depends only on v, , and the last two terms represent a constant chosen to give (Notice that x(v,, vJ is paid by the buyer even if he does not get the object.) To check incentive-compatibility of (6), observe that So the buyer would do better reporting v2 rather than viz if his true valuation is v,. (This argument holds even if G2 > v2, in which case the integrand is negative, but the direction of integration is backwards, giving a nonnegative integral overall.) The proof of incentive-compatibility for the seller is analogous.
Thus, since (p, x) is incentive-compatible, (1) applies. Because U,(u,) = 0, and because we have assumed (2), we must have U,(b,).> 0. By the monotonicity properties of U,(s) and U,(.), it sufftces to check individualrationality for the buyer's lowest valuation and the seller's highest valuation. Thus, our proof of Theorem 1 is complete. That is, in an ex post efftcient mechanism, the buyer gets the object whenever his valuation is higher, and the seller keeps the object whenever his valuation is higher. For such a mechanism, p,(v,) = 1 -P,(v,), which is decreasing, and &(vJ = F,(v,), which is increasing. Thus, to check whether ex post efficient mechanisms are feasible, it only remains to check whether inequality MYERSON AND SATTERTHWAITE (2) in Theorem 1 holds for this p(., e). In fact, for an ex post efficient mechanism, we get:
= a22 b*.m*) + F*(u*) -11 F,(u*) du* P -P 2 min~u*~l(~*), bll f&J*) do* 02
Thus, if a, < b, and a, < b*, so that the two valuation-intervals properly intersect, then any Bayesian incentive-compatible mechanism which is ex post efficient must give U,(b,) + U*(a*) = -p' (1 -F*(f)) F,(t) df < 0, a2 (7) and so it cannot be individually rational. Thus, this quantity
is the smallest lump-sum subsidy required from an outside party to create a Bayesian incentive-compatible mechanism which is both ex post efficient and individually rational. (Thus far in this paper we have been assuming that no such subsidy is actually available. We will consider the case of trading with a broker more generally in Section 5.)
To summarize, we have shown the following result. Then the mechanism "sell at price 2 if both are willing (otherwise no trade)" is incentive-compatible, individually-rational, and ex post efficient. But if we admit any small positive probability density over the whole of these intersecting intervals, then neither this mechanism nor any other feasible mechanism can satisfy ex post efficiency.
To apply this theory, consider the case where P, and vz are both uniformly distributed on [0, I]. Then, each I;;.(vi) = vi andyi = 1 on this interval, and the constraint (2) becomes ' O< li ' (P, -II-P,lh-h 4 dv, do,
Thus, conditional on the individuals reaching an agreement to trade, the expected difference in their valuations must be at least l/2. This conclusion holds when these traders use rational equilibrium strategies, no matter what the rules of their bargaining game might be (provided only that either trader could refuse to participate if his expected gains from trade were negative, so that individual rationality is guaranteed). Conditional on the buyer's valuation being higher than the seller's, the expected difference VT -P, would be only ' u2 J-I 0 0 2(v, -v,) dv, dv, = f in this problem. Thus, ex post effkiency cannot be achieved by any individually-rational mechanism, unless some outsider is willing to provide a subsidy of at least I ' (1 -t)tdt=+ 0 to the traders for participating in the bargaining game.
MAXIMIZING EXPECTED TOTAL GAINS FROM TRADE
The expected total gains from trade in a mechanism is just lb' u,(v,)f,(v,) dv, + lb2 ~&dfzW dv, a1 02
(12 aI
Since ex post efficiency is unattainable, it is natural to seek a mechanism that maximizes expected total gains from trade, subject to the incentivecompatibility and individual-rationality constraints. (Of course, other collective objective functions could also be considered, but here we shall just consider the problem of maximizing expected gains from trade.) With a bit of machinery, we can show how to solve this problem for a wide class of examples.
First, we define some new functions. For any number a > 0, let Notice that p" is the ex post efficient outcome function (transferring the object iff v1 < u2), whereas p1 maximizes the integral in inequality (2). which is decreasing in a, so p"(v,, UJ is decreasing in a. Thus, for a < /3, G@) differs from G(a) only because 0 =pB(u, , II*) < p"(u, , v2) = 1 for some (v,, v2) where c,(v,,p) < c,(u,,P) and so c,(u,, 1) < c, (u,, 1) . Thus, G(-) is increasing.
To prove that G(.) is continuous, observe that, if each ci(ui, 1) is increasing in v,, then each cl(uI, a) is strictly increasing in vi, for any a < 1. So given v2 and a, the equation c,(u, , a) = cZ(vZ, a) has at most one solution in u r, and this solution varies continuously in u, and a. Thus, we may write where g(u,, a) is continuous in v2 and a. So G(a) is continuous, increasing, and G(1) 2 0. But G(0) < 0, because otherwise p" would be an ex post efficient individually-rational mechanism, which is impossible by Corollary 1. Thus there must be some a in (0, I] such that G(a) = 0 and p" can satisfy the conditions in Theorem 2. This completes the proof of Theorem 2. 1
For an example, consider again the case where P, and pZ are both uniform random variables on [0, 11. Then, and c,(u,, a) = v, + au1 = (1 + a) 2), c2(u2, a) = u2 -a( 1 -u2) = (1 + a) vq -a.
Both of these functions are monotone increasing when a = 1, so we know that the expected gains from trade are maximized by p =p" for some a between 0 and 1. To get U,(b,) = U&z,) = 0 for p =p", we must have (by Eq. (1) So the expected gains from trade are maximized by a mechanism which transfers the object iff the buyer's valuation exceeds the seller's by at least l/4. Such a mechanism has indeed been found for this example. Chatterjee and Samuelson [2] have studied a bargaining game with the following rules. The buyer and seller each simultaneously propose a price. If the buyer's price is higher than the seller's, then the object is sold at the average of the two; otherwise the seller keeps the object. This mechanism is not incentivecompatible. In fact, Chatterjee and Samuelson have shown that in the equilibrium strategies for this example, the seller proposes price 2/3u, + l/4 and the buyer proposes price 2/3 u2 + l/12. Thus, the object is sold iff ful+f<+u2++ or 1 u,<u,--7 4 and the sale price is In this equilibrium, there is no possibility of trade if P, = 1 or P, = 0, so U,(l) = U,(O) = 0. Thus, this equilibrium of this split-the-difference game gives the highest expected total gains from trade among all equilibria of all bargaining games satisfying individual-rationality for this symmetric-uniform trading problem.
To illustrate the revelation principle, we may point out that the incentivecompatible direct mechanism equivalent to the Chatterjee-Samuelson equilibrium for this example is to have That is, the direct mechanism simply implements what the original game would have done after the players used their equilibrium strategies.
TRADING WITH A BROKER
Thus far, we have assumed that the payments from the buyer must equal the payments to the seller, because there is no outside source (or sink) of funds. Let us now drop this assumption, and allow a third party to either subsidize or exploit the buyer and seller. We shall refer to this third party as the broker.
Let us assume that the broker can be a net source or sink of money, but he cannot himself own the object. Thus, a trading mechanism with a broker is characterized by three outcome functions (p, xi, x2), where p(v i , v,) is the probability that the object is transferred from the seller to the buyer, x,(0,, ur) is the expected payment from broker to seller, and xZ(ul, UJ is the expected payment from buyer to broker, if vi and v2 are the reported valuations of seller and buyer. Given such a mechanism, we define ii( %W P, (G P2(G9 W,) and W4 exactly as in Section 2, except that we must modify the definitions of Xi(u,) and f, (v,) to:
In addition, we let U, denote the expected net profit for the broker, so that
The definitions of incentive-compatibility and individual-rationality for a trading mechanism with broker are the same as in Section 2: neither buyer nor seller should ever expect to gain by lying about his valuation, and both traders should get nonnegative expected gains from trade in the mechanism. As before, there is no loss of generality in restricting our attention to incentive-compatible mechanisms, because any Bayesian equilibrium of any trading game with broker can be simulated by an equivalent incentivecompatible direct mechanism. (That is, the expected gains from trade minus the expected net profit to the broker must equal the expected gains to buyer and seller.) With this one change, the proof goes through exactly as before. m
Extending the results in Section 3, Theorem 3 implies that, for any ex post efficient mechanism with broker,
Thus, the minimum expected subsidy required from the broker, to achieve ex post efficiency with individual-rationality, is
even if the subsidy is not lump-sum.
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Another interesting question is to ask for the mechanism which maximizes the expected profit to the broker, subject to incentive compatibility and individual rationality for the two traders. That is, if the buyer and seller can only trade through the broker, then what is the optimal mechanism for the broker? for any incentive-compatible mechanism. To maximize this expression subject to individual rationality, we want
and U,(b,) = U,(a,) = 0. It only remains to construct x, and x2 such that (p, xi, x2) satisfies these conditions and incentive compatibility. There are many ways to do this; one is to let xz(u,, u2) =P(u~, 4 -minkIt, > a2 and GO,) 2 C,(u,)L xl(vl, u2) = P(u,, 4 . max{t, It, < b, and C,(t,) < G(vdl.
That is, if there is a trade, then the broker charges the buyer the lowest valuation he could have quoted and still gotten the object (given the seller's valuation), and the broker pays to the seller the highest valuation which he could have quoted and still sold the object (given the buyer's valuation). If there is no trade, then there are no payments. It is straightforward to show that this mechanism is incentive-compatible if the C,(.) and C,(.) functions are monotone, following the argument used by Vickrey [7] to show the incentive-compatibility of the second price auction. For example, if the seller reported a valuation higher than the truth, he would not affect the price he gets when he sells, but he would lose some opportunities to sell when he could have done so profitably in the mechanism. Similarly, if the seller reported a valuation lower than the truth, then he would only add possibilities of selling below his valuation. It is also straightforward to check that U,(b,) = 0 and U&z,) = 0 in this mechanism, since it gives x,(4 3 4 =I@, 7 02) b, 9 X*(~,,~*)=P(~,,~*)a,. I
For the case where P, and 3; are both uniform on [0, I], the broker's optimal mechanism transfers the object if and only if C,(F*) = zt?, -1 > 2l7i = C,(P,), or VZ -8, > f.
So the broker should offer to buy from the seller for vZ -l/2, and should offer to sell to the buyer for P, + l/2, and trade occurs if and only if the traders are both willing to trade at these prices.
Comparing Theorems 2 and 4, we see that the broker's optimal trading mechanism has strictly less trading than the mechanism which maximizes the expected total gains from trade. In this symmetric-uniform example, the maximum expected total gains from trade is achieved by a mechanism in which the object is transferred whenever the buyer's valuation exceeds the seller's by at least l/4, but the broker's optimal mechanism does not transfer the object unless the buyer's valuations exceeds the seller's by at least l/2. That is, if a broker is to profitably exploit his control over the trading channel, he must actually restrict trade to some extent.
In both Theorems 2 and 4, monotonicity of the C,(.) functions is required. This assumption is satisfied for a very wide class of distributions, but it is a restriction. The general case can be analyzed using the methods developed in Myerson [6] to construct optimal auctions in the general (nonmonotone) case.
